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The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulties.[12] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives in the countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[13]

The cadre carries on the effort to destroy traditional mores. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages, lectures on sanitation, and, sometimes with the help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units, dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination, practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[14]

The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to in-

12. W. W. Rostow, The Prospects of Communist China, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

13. Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, Apr. 20, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), 1036, Apr. 28, 1955.

14. People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

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to patrol the streets at night. 000

Other controls imposed by the security agencies and other government branches add to public discontent. Among these measures are the extensive rationing system and the frequent investigations conducted by public security agencies. 668 434

The Communists appear to be cognizant of such inconveniences which cause public dissatisfaction. In order to mitigate the situation, the Communists stress the importance of adopting a "mass line" policy. This means that the government orders its agencies to be mindful, insofar as possible, of public wishes when carrying out government policies. Communist cadres are instructed to report public feeling to the government. Propaganda agencies then attempt to "explain away" public complaints and to restore the public temper. 668 208

B. Tension within Organizations

Extreme control and centralization exercised by the Communist Party result in tension within all Party, state, and mass organizations.[37] By establishing various agencies of control, the Party has achieved centralization of power; however, these numerous control agencies often duplicate their functions. This leads to suspicion, tension, and a growing sense of wasted effort in the control agencies and in the organizations controlled by these agencies. 668

1. Tension within Government

Party control over the government is evident

37. For comparison with tension in Soviet Union, see Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Univ. Press, 1953; Carryington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1954.

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PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

"...When a man of low station is
well instructed, he is easily ruled."[1]
-- Confucius

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Ever since its inception, the Communist regime of China has been making concerted efforts to reputidate Confucian principles. But on one point at least the regime seems to be in agreement with Confucius; namely, when a government has well instructed its people, it finds them far easier to govern.

The Communist regime believes in and practices coercion and persuasion. By coercion it suppressess opposition and compels obedience. But it is through persuasion that it attempts to change the attitudes and win the support of the masses. One of the Communists' methods of winning popular support is propaganda.

Like everything else under the Communist regime, propaganda is strictly directed and controlled by a central authority, especially with regard to issues and themes. Reserving the issues and propaganda themes of a national character for detailed analysis in the Over-all China Handbook, the present survey of propaganda in Central-South

1. "Confucian Analects," The Chinese Classics, James Legge (trans.), 2nd ed., Vol. I, London, Clarendon Press, 1893, p. 319.

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China will be directed primarily toward the propaganda machinery operating in the region, for only in an investigation of the development and operation of specific propaganda machinery can we discover regional variations. 208

In the course of this survey an attempt will be made to explain the extent to which the people of Central-South China are kept informed of public affairs and to what extent the information made available to them is factual.

I. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROPAGANDA

The Dual System at the Regional Level Like the administration of propaganda on the national level, propaganda in the Central-South Region is administered under a dual system, consisting of the apparatus of the Communist Party of China and of the government at different levels. Two departments existed prior to the abolition, in November 1954, of the Central-South China Administrative Committee: the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the regional government. Although these organizations took orders from their respective superiors on both the national and regional levels, the relationship between them appears to have been similar to that between the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee and the Commission on Cultural

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and Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council on the national level.[2] 208

To put it more concretely, prior to November 1954, the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Party, like its counterpart on the national level, was not primarily an operational agency. It did not do any major publishing nor did it operate radio stations or cinemas. It was devoted to the transmission of the propaganda policy of its superiors to appropriate agenciws on the regional and provincial levels, drew up regional plans for the execution of the policy, and supervised the execution of that policy by the Party, the government, and the mass organizations which operated the media of propaganda.

As for the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee, it s functions were essentially the same as its counterpart on the national level. It was mainly charged with the responsibility of day-to-day management of propaganda, which found its expression in cultural and educational activities.

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2. Specifically, the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee operated under the direction of the bureau itself and of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs was directed by the Central-South China Administrative Committee and by the Commission on Cultural and Cultural Affairs of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government.

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More specifically, the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Communist Party of China served primarily as a regional representative of the central authorities of the Party in the supervision of the execution of propaganda policy of a national nature, while the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee acted to a large extent as the chief regional executor of that policy in the region. But with regard to propaganda issues of a regional nature, the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Party was the policy-maker. Its policies regarding regional propaganda issues became the policies of the region and were carried out by the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee. This was achieved not by direct orders, but by placing its own men in the latter organization. For example, when the Central-South China Administrative Committee was in existence, Chao I-min served as the principal personal link between the Department of Propaganda of the Central-South Bureau of the Party and the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Central-South China Administrative Committee, by acting concurrently as the director of the former and as the chairman of the latter. This was perfectly in line with the practice of the Communist Party of China of exercising leadership over the government on the China Mainland.

The Dual System at Lower Levels. Such a dual system for the administration of propaganda is found

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on all local levels within the region. Even the lowliest Party branches or government units have their own propaganda setups,[3] which have the same working relationship with one another as their counterparts on the higher levels and which are supervised by their respective superior authorities. In short, the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China controls and directs all local propaganda activities in the regions.

While speaking of the central control of the propaganda organs in Central-South China, special mention must be made of two agencies: (1) the Department of Propaganda of the South-China Sub-bureau of the Communist Party of China; and (2) the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the South-China Sub-committee of the Central-South Administrative Committee. Like their respective parent organizations, the South-China Sub-bureau of the Communist Party of China and the South-China Subcommittee of the Central-South China Administrative Committee, these two agencies functioned in

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3. Some Party branch committees have merely a secretary in charge of propaganda and agitation activities. See Articles 31-35 of the "Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and the Local People's Councils of the People's Republic of China." An English text may be found in Current Background, No. 302, November 5, 1954, pp. 6-14.

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the South China area only and had no counterpart elsewhere within the region. They were designed to direct propaganda and other activities in the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, which are considerably different geographically and socially from the rest of the provinces in the Central-South China region. Although the above mentioned agencies of the Party and government are charged with the primary responsibility of administering propaganda and releasing information on public affairs, other agencies of the Party and government also have a certain role to play in these matters. Indeed, a considerable amount of information, factual or otherwise, on the activities of individual government agencies emanates from the agencies concerned.

II. MEDIA OF PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Like their counterparts in other regions of China, the propaganda agencies and other official organizations in Central-South China use all available means to communicate propaganda and a certain amount of information on public affairs which the people in the region are to know. Newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, movies, radio, the stage, painting, songs, posters, exhibits, speeches, handbills, classroom lectures, mass meetings, demonstrations, and even court decisions are permeated with propaganda, even though some of these are not necessarily media of public information. For obvious reasons, this discussion of propaganda and public information media is limited to those which can be best treated on a regional basis.

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The Press as a Propaganda Medium and Its Structure Characterized by a high degree of specialization, the structure of the press in Central-South China, which is an integral part of the press in Communist China as a whole, is such as to enable each of its parts to reach specific audiences and to serve a definite function in the socialist (and Communist) education of the masses.

Like the press apparatus of the nation, the press in Central-South China is divided horizontally and vertically. The horizontal division follows closely the hierarchical structure of the government and the Communist Party of China. At each level there is an appropriate press to serve the Party, government, and public organizations. Thus, prior to the abolition of the regional administrative system of the government, the Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily] served as the official newspaper of the Central-South China region.

In addition, there are a number of newspapers on the provincial level. At present each of the provinces in the region has its own official newspaper, as listed below.

Hupeh Jih-pao [Hupeh Daily] (Hankow, Hupei)
Hsin Hunan Pao [New Hunan Daily] (Changsha, Hunan)
Honan Jih-pao [Honan Daily] (Chengchow, Honan)
Kiangsi Jih-pao [Kiangsi Daily] (Nanchang, Kiangsi)
Nan-fang Jih-pao [South-China Daily] (Canton, Kwangtung)
Kwangsi Jih-pao [Kwangsi Daily] (Kweilin, Kwangsi)

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Below the provincial level are newspapers on the administrative district level. At the base of the pyramid are newspapers onthe hsien or city level. 204 208

The vertical division follows functional lines. Individual newspapers serve different classes of readers.

By the fall of 1950, the Central-South China region had 51 newspapers above the administrative district level.[4] The exact number of hsien newspapers has never been made known.

Printed newspapers are supplemented by many mimeographed newspapers and hand-written "wall newspapers" and "blackboard newspapers" in small localities, factories, schools, mass organizations, and agricultural producers' co-operatives. These special newspapers are also organs of the Party and the government, and they have regular editors, editorial boards, and correspondents. The local Party branches constantly keep a watchful eye on their operation and development, and from time to time issue new instructions and regulations to keep them in line. 203 208

4. Teng Tzu-hui, "Chung-nan I-nien-lai Chih Hui-ku" (1950) ["Retrospect on Central-South China During the Last Year"], Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, October 1, 1950.

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The importance of these special newspapers must not be overlooked. In vies of the fact that all the printed newspapers in the region by the fall of 1950, had an approximate combined circulation of only 50,000 issues daily, it must be obvious that the Communists have been forced to make maximum use of such special newspapers for propaganda and agitation. Like the oral agitator and propagandist, the wall newspaper and blackboard newspapers have the advantages of flexibility and adaptability for mass communication. These advantages are particularly conducive to agitation work. For instance, they can deal more effectively with the problem of production by seizing upon the most appropriate opportunities to criticize indifferent workers and praise energetic ones.

While an overwhelming majority of the press in Central-South China is owned and operated by the Communists Party of China, the government, or mass oranizations in 1950 , there were eight newspapers in the region operated by private interests, the most notable being the Ta-kang Pao [Ta-kang News], published in Hankow. Private newspapers in this region, like other newspapers in Communist China, underwent a thorough re-organization in the years 1951-52. Upon this re-organization they lost their former identity and independent status and have become part of the propaganda apparatus of the Party and the government. The Ta-kang Pao, for example, has been renamed the Hsin Wuhan Pao [New Wuhan News] and serves as the official organ

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of the Wuhan Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China.[5]

Subscriptions to the newspapers in this region are handled through the local post offices. The Communists claim that this arrangement had brought about at least two good results: greater speed of delivery and a wider circulation.[6] Students and members of the armed forces are reportedly entitled to reduced rates.

Propaganda Work of the Press As an instrument of propaganda, the press devotes a large amount of space to the publication of "lectures," documents, and other pronouncements elucidating Communist theories, the Communist Party line, and the policies of the government, with a view to remolding the ideology of the masses and influencing public attitudes on political issues. Generally, the press is given very little freedom of action. Important material is distributed to the local press by the Hsin-hua [New China] News Agency. According to a regulation promulgated by the now defunct Information Administration of the Government Administration Council,[7] "all large newspapers"

6. Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, March 13, 1951.

7. "Hsin-wen Tsung-shu Kuan-yü Pao-chih T'sai-yung Hsin-hua-she Tien-kao Ti Kuei-ting" ["The Information Administration's Regulations Concerning the Use of News Releases of the Hsin-hua News Agency by the Press"], People's Daily, January 12, 1950.

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in the country must print in full the important news releases and special articles distributed by the New China News Agency. The newspapers in the region, to further Communist ideology and government policies, write and publish articles supplementary to those distributed by national propaganda organs. Supplementary articles are usually written in a more popular style and expound general themes by linking them with local issues or concrete problems, whenever such an approach is permissible and feasible. In point of fact, newspapers in Central-South China have been praised by the Communists for having done an excellent job in this regard. By way of illustration, the Yangtze Daily pointed out on July 13, 1952, that many newspapers in the Central-South China region printed the full text of the 10-plank agricultural-production policy for 1952 and accompanied it with a series of illustrations. It in turn praised other newspapers of the region, such as the Hunan Ta-chung Pao [Hunan Popular Daily], the Yüan-chou Pao [Yüan-chou Daily], and the Tzu-chiang Nung-min Pao [Tzu-chiang Farmers' Daily], for having devoted special columns to a detailed exposition of the agricultural-production policy.

Agitation Work of the Press The press in Central-South China makes a constant effort to eulogize the "People's Dictatorship," Marxism, Leninism, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and the history and contributions of the Communist Party of China. It even prints ordinary news items in

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such a way as to inculcate in the people a feeling of national pride and to help them develop an unwavering faith in the socialist construction and socialist transformation of China under the leadership of the Communist Party. In treating news involving non-Communist countries, the newspapers find frequent opportunities to assert that the people of the capitalist countries are being exploited mercilessly, that the capitalist system is on its way to destruction, and that present world tensions are caused by capitalist warmongers, especially those in the United States. After the outbreak of warfare in Korea, the anti-America campaign was played up by the press, so that the Chinese people might be called upon to make greater contributions and sacrifices for the attainment of the ambitious goals set by the regime.

The most successful agitation work done by the newspapers resulted in the acceleration of production. This was achieved by summarizing and disseminating information about the most successful economic enterprises and the methods and techniques of "advanced" workers; by explaining to workers and farmers the purposes of the economic measures taken by the Party and government; by bringing to the attention of the population the economic development of the nation; by publicizing the contributions of outstanding individual workers and farmers; by discussing ways and means for the solution of the difficulties facing the country in its economic construction; and by exhorting the people to make even greater efforts.

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The Press as a Medium of Public Information

Although the press is primarily used to conduct propaganda and agitation, it also contains a large amount of more-or-less straightforward information on public affairs. As mentioned in another connection, newspapers in this region, as in Communist China as a whole, usually print the text of important Party or government decisions and the text of the report of some responsible official on the activities of his agency. They also feature some important announcement concerning the commencement of campaigns, the completion of water conservation projects and the beginning of the autumn harvest on the farms.

The newspapers also seek to influence the formation of political attitudes; and for this reason they often accompany such informational material with a front-page leader and other articles to explain and justify the decisions or activities of the Party or government. But if the reader is both judicious and clever in distinguishing the factual presentation of news and efforts toward political propaganda, he will still be able to learn from the Communist newspapers what the latest actions and decisions of the authorities are, especially in the field of internal affairs. Chinese Communist newspapers contain more information on governmental activities than did the former official Kuomintang press. Unlike the former Kuomintang regime, the Communist authorities are apparently not satisfied with the practice of publishing government or Party decisions

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or decrees in official gazettes. It is their intention that such materials shall come to the direct attention of the people, and the most certain way of insuring that the people will see these materials is to order their publication in all newspapers. 204 208.

By making the texts of official policies or decisions available to the average citizen, the Communist regime hopes to win his support in their execution. What is denied to the Chinese people on the Mainland today is the right to receive public information from sources other than Communist controlled media. Because they obtain news on governmental activities only from official sources, the Chinese people have no way of listening to diversified interpretations of the news, as do people in the United States. By providing the public with the "official version," the Communist press helps the regime to mobilize public opinion and the change people's attitudes, but it refuses to help the people conduct a public debate on national affairs in a manner we would call democratic. Therefore, the charges that the Communist press treats as news social processes rather than events, and that it does not print news until the "official version" has been decided, are matters of secondary importance in an evaluation of the role of the Communist press in the formation of public opinion.

The Press as an Instrument of Public Control

The press in Central-South China performs another function in addition to being a medium of propaganda,

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agitation, and public information. This function is the responsibility of serving as an instrument of mass or public control, and its importance can be best appreciated if one recalls the complexity of the tasks of a regime seeking to regulate every minute detail of national life. The manifold activities of the regime naturally have rendered inadequate the formal instruments of control such as the law enforcement officers, court machinery, the procuratorates, and other supervisory agencies. To supplement these formal agencies of supervision, the regime found at its inception that it was necessary to establish informal procedures of control over the execution of the tremendous numbers of complex regulations and orders.

The press serves as an instrument of informal control by acting as a medium for official and popular criticism of the course of the development of Chinese society and its component parts. In Communist China, "public criticism" in the press is a formalized phenomenon, actively encouraged and yet carefully guided by the regime. It has little if anything to do with the spontaneous development of public opinion. Like public criticism in the Soviet press, this function of the press in Communist China is an extension of the practice of self-criticism which prevails within the organizations of the Communist Party.

On April 22, 1950, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China promulgated a document called "Decisions Concerning the Conduct

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of Criticism and Self-Criticism in Newspapers and Periodicals."[8] The Central Committee of the ruling party called upon the press to "induce" the masses to undertake "open criticism" of all shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the Party and government. Since that time, the newspapers in Central-South China have tried to perform this function well. They do so by devoting a large proportion of their total space to critical decisions issued by the Party and the government and to editorials and articles exposing deliquencies on the part of functionaries and institutions, in order to uncover manifestations of bureaucracy, opportunism, and deviation from the Party line. They also carry out this task by publishing "letters to the editor." Written by either the average citizen or a non-professional correspondent (the Chinese counterpart of the rabsel 'kor of the Soviet Press), such letters express certain grievances and complaints or address certain appeals to Communist authorities on a higher level. More than most other resources available to the people in the region, such letters frequently prove effective in the expression of popular feeling and in securing ameliorative action from the authorities. In short, the "letters to the editor" columns in the newspapers not only serve as a center to which the grievances of the citizenry against the bureaucratic apparatus are directed, but also provide the Communist Party with an opportunity to check on the activities of local government and public organizations.

8. For its text, see ibid., April 22, 1950.

The political impact of self-criticism conducted through the newspapers cannot be evaluated entirely on the basis of the preceding description. "Self-criticism" operates within carefully defined limits which considerably restrict its potential influence as a democratic force. The press is not allowed to criticize indiscriminately. In its decision on April 22, 1950, the Central-Committee of the Communist Party cautioned that it was necessary for the press to distinguish "between true and constructive criticism on the one hand and destructive criticism on the other." By "destructive criticism" the Communists meant any criticism which is aimed at repudiating the "people's democratic dictatorship," opposing the "Common Program," destroying social discipline, shaking people's faith in leadership, and "causing pessimism and disunity among the masses." This means that no criticism can be directed against any basic policy established by the Communist regime. Nor is it permissible for the press to make any open criticism of the top leaders or of the regime itself. What the press can do is to criticize officials on a lower echelon of corruption, disloyalty, or delinquency in the exectuion of policies of the regime. Viewed in this context, it is clear that the press as an instrument of public control is not only relatively harmless to the existing regime but is actually designed and operated to support it.

Radio as a Propaganda and Public Information Medium Radio, as another medium of propaganda and public information used by the Communists in

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Central-South China, should be briefly mentioned. Like the press, the radio has been recognized by the Communists as a powerful weapon of political propaganda and education. But when they assumed control of the Central-South Region, the Communists found very few radio broadcasting facilities which could be used. They took immediate steps to set up broadcasting stations in Honan and Kwangsi. The latest statistics on radio broadcasting facilities in the region are not available. As of June 1951, the following stations were in operation.

RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS IN CENTRAL-SOUTH CHINA
(June 1951)

Classification	Location	Wave Length (Kilocycles)
1 Regional Broadcasting Station	Wuhan	700, 6645, and 7275
5 Provincial Broadcasting Stations	Honan	- *
	Kiangsi	-
	Hunan	-
	Kwangtung	-
	Kwangsi	-
5 Municipal Broadcasting Stations	Wuhan	1150
	Canton	913, 1203 and 1703
	Kaifeng	-
	Changsha	-
	Nanchang	-

* Not available.

Source: Chung-nan Kuang-po [Central-South Broadcasting Journal], Vol. II, No. 2, June 1, 1951, pp. 5-6.

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In line with the general practice in Communist China,[9] radio stations on the regional and provincial levels were used primarily to announce decrees and regulations and to broadcast news of the region or province concerned. The main task of municipal stations was to conduct "social education," essentially a form of propaganda and agitation. These stations did not originate news programs of a national or international nature; they merely transmit such programs emanated from the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking.

Administratively, the regional broadcasting station took orders from the Radiobroadcasting Bureau of the Central People's Government, whereas provincial and municipal stations were under the dual supervision of the Central Radiobroadcasting Bureau and the regional station. Their daily activities were controlled by the Party and government agencies on corresponding levels.

No information has been given by the Chinese Communists on the new designation of the regional station after the abolishment of the regional administration. It is possible that this station has been relegated to a provincial status to serve Hupei Province.

Radio Facilities As of June 1951, there were

9. Mei I, "Wo-kuo Jen-min Kuang-po Shih-yeh Kai-k'uang," ["General Survey of the People's Radiobroadcasting in China"], ibid., April 25, 1950.

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approximately 100,000 radio receiving sets in Central-South China. An overwhelming majority were concentrated in a few large cities. Radio receiving sets in Canton, Swatow, and Chiang-men, all in Kwangtung Province, accounted for two-thirds of the total number.[10] While about 20 per cent of these radio receiving sets were used "collectively" by listeners in groups, the remainder were owned by individual citizens or commercial firms.

Since June 1951, the Communists in Central-South China have increased the number of radio receiving sets in the region. But such an increase must have been slight, since there is a shortage of radio parts and technicians.

Radio Broadcast Monitors. The limited number of radio stations and receiving sets, however, is not an accurate indication of the effectiveness of the radio as a medium of propaganda and public information. Any measurement of such effectiveness must take into account the "broadcast monitors" operating in government offices and units of the armed forces, and in public gathering places such as factories and schools. Some of these monitors are appointed; others are voluntary workers.[11] All

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10. "Chung-nan Ch'ü Jen-min Kuang-po Shih-yeh Kai-k'uang" ["General Survey of the People's Radio-broadcasting in Central-South China"], Chung-nan Kuang-po [Central-South Broadcasting Journal], Vol II, No. 2, June 1, 1951, p. 5.

11. See "Shou-yin-yüan T'iao-li" ["Regulations on the Work of Monitors"], People's Daily, April 30 1950. When the monitors work in teams, their teams are called "monitoring stations." As of June 1951, (continued next page)

are utilized to cope with the problems caused by the shortage of radio reception facilities. The Communists hope that, by appointing monitors they may make the most effective use of the limited number of radio-receiving sets available. The monitors jot down broadcasts, transcribe and mimeograph them, or rewrite them in the form of "wall newspapers," thus making it possible for the material to reach a larger audience.

The fact that monitors can help increase the effectiveness of radio is enhanced by the two provisions contained in the "Regulations on the Work of Monitors" promulgated on April 29, 1950, by the Central People's Radiobroadcasting Station.[12] One of the provisions requires the monitors to concentrate on receiving programs such as speeches made by the government leaders, social science lectures, government decrees, news reports, and other items which might help to mold the political and cultural attitudes of the listener. The second provision is that the monitors must report to the responsible radio station their reception work and the reactions of their fellow listeners, so that the station can check on their work as monitors and readjust its programs, if necessary, in the light of the reactions of the audience.

Radio-Diffusion Exchanges In connection with broadcast reception, brief mention should be

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11. (continued) there were 536 such stations in Central-South China. Almost every county government had one station.

12. See Article 2, ibid.

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made of the radio-diffusion exchange. Radio diffusion is a device for disseminating broadcasts by means of a network of speakers attached to a single reception set. Each net is called a radio-diffusion exchange. The use of radio-diffusion exchanges has proved of special value in Kwangtung Province. As of June 1955, there were 213 such exchanges, 70 operating in towns and cities and 143 in factories, mines, and business offices.[13] There are at least two major advantages gained by the use of such a device. First, it enables the Communists to use a minimum number of receition sets to reach a maximum number of radio listeners. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the wired network of the radio-diffusion exchange has a greater adaptability to propaganda control. Since the radio-diffusion exchange selects the programs to be relayed by scattered speakers, it is easy to rule out any possibility of intrusion of enemy radio propaganda. In view of the proximity of Kwangtung Province to Hong Kong and the free world, the use of the radio-diffusion exchange by the Communists in that province is quite understandable.

The Stage as a Propaganda Medium The Communists recognize the traditional Chinese drama as "an effective instrument for educating the masses with revolutionary spirit and patriotism."[14] Committees have been formed and charged with the

13. Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, June 2, 1955.

14. People's Daily, December 17, 1950.

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task of reforming the local theaters by replacing their "feudalistic, superstitious, and anti-labor" themes with those which might help "publicize and eulogize the people's dictatorship, the Communist Party, and the people's government; awaken the political conscience of the people; stimulate the zeal for production on the part of the people; and praise the new personalities and events of society."[15] In 1950, for example, in the city of Wuhan alone, 31 traditional opera scripts were revised, and 75 traditional dramas were staged according to new scripts. It was also reported that some 700,000 people in Wuhan attended performances.[16] During the same year, committees in Hupei Province revised more than 90 scripts of local operas and presented 152 performances based on new scripts.[17]

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15. Ch'en Huang-mei, "Chia-ch'iang T'uan-chieh Kai-chin Hsi-ch'ü Kai-ko Kung-tso", ["Strenghtening the Unity of the Acting Profession and Improving our Drama Reform Work"], Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, October 16, 1952.

16. Teng's report cited above.

17. Li Hsien-nien, "Hupeh Sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu I-nien-lai Shih-cheng Kung-tso Yü Chin-hou Jen-wu,"] "On the Work of the Current and the Future Tasks of the People's Provincial Government of Hupeh,"] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [A Compendium of Government Reports (1950)], Peking, 1951, p. 871.

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The use of the local stage as a medium of propaganda again indicates the strategy of the Communists, who know that since the Chinese people are fond of their traditional plays, the use of such material in propaganda work will prove effective. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the stage as an instrument for propaganda lies in the fact that plays appeal to both literate and illiterate people. Since about 80 per cent of the Chinese people are illiterate, the medium of drama is ideal for the dissemination of propaganda, especially since there are many local dramatic troupes available. Like every other group in Communist China engaged in propaganda work, dramatic troupes are constantly watched and rigidly controlled by the propaganda authorities in the region.

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Books, Pamphlets, and Comic Strips as a Medium of Propaganda and Public Information In November 1951, immediately following the reorganization of the major publishing houses in such places as Shanghai and Peking, the Central-South Branch of the Hsin-hua Book Store (official book distributor of the Communist regime) launched a drive to collect old books for destruction. The reason cited was an effort to "clean up lingering feudalistic poison."[18] Up to July 1952, tons of old books, mainly Chinese classics, were collected from the people in Hunan and Hupeh. Some of these books were burned, others were shipped to Shanghai and other cities for conversion into paper pulp.

18. Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, January 25, 1953.

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The Communists' effort to eliminate books with ideologically objectionable contents was paralleled by endeavors to provide the people with books, pamphlets, comic strips, and other publications designed for political indoctrination. In additional to shipping such books from Peking and Shanghai, where the nation's major publishing houses are located, the Communists in this region also have local presses turning out publications for local readers. At present each provincial government in the region operates a "People's press," which publishes books, pamphlets, and other works of a political nature. In many provinces there are also so-called "specialized presses" devoted to the publication of books in specialized fields for the worker, the farmer, and young people.

Local authorities also make full use of the small number of privately and semi-privately owned publishing houses in publishing literature for purposes of propaganda and mass indoctrination.

Publications are not distributed by the publishers themselves but by a separate book distributing network consisting of two channels, public and private. The public channel consists of the branch stores of the Hsin-hua Book Company. As of September 1950, there were 505 such branch stores of "various grades" in Central-South China.[19] At the same time,

19. Chao I-min, "Kuan-yü Wen-chiao Wei-yüan-hui Ti Kung-tso Pao-kao," ["Report on the Work of the Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs"], Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [A Compendium of Government Reports (1950)], Peking, 1951, pp. 757-758.

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incomplete statistics showed that the private channel of the book distributing network included 448 privately-owned bookstores as well as sidewalk book stalls, which numbered 586 in Wuhan alone.[20]

To make publications intended for the masses still more conveniently accessible to the popular reader, the Communist regime has reportedly established an impressive number of "cultural palaces" (community centers) and reading rooms in cities, towns, and villages. For instance, in Kwangsi Province there are 120 "large cultural palaces," 186 "small cultural places," and 973 reading rooms.[21]

Information on other media of propaganda and public information are by no means less important than the press, radio, the stage, and books and other publications. They have been omitted simply because there is less justification for dealing with them on a regional basis. Most if not all are systematically controlled and utilized by the Communists, and the propaganda they communicate and the information on public affairs they provide are similar to those communicated through the media we have discussed.

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20. Ibid.

21. The Sixth Department of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, Kwangsi Fei-ch'ing [Communist Rule in Kwangsi], Taipei, Taiwan, 1955, p. 29.

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III. THE MASS PROPAGANDA NETWORK

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Besides the conventional propaganda organs, the Communists have established a "mass propaganda network," consisting of so-called propaganda officers and reporting officers. This "propaganda network" is not a unique arrangement in this region; like other propaganda devices, it is an integral part of a nation-wide organization. The mass propaganda network operates under the sole control and direction of the Communist Party of China and has no operational relationship with the governmental hierarchy. It was established in January 1951 in pursuance of a directive of the Central Committee, "Decision Concerning the Establishment Throughout the Party of a Propaganda Network for the Masses."[22] It was designed to intensify and broaden the work of propaganda and agitation, making it a task not only for the working personnel in the formal propaganda organs, but for "every Communist."

The Propaganda Officer: His Selection and Appointment Propaganda officers are selected by the Party branch headquarters from among Party members, Youth Corps members, the masses in direct contact with the branch headquarters, model workers and other active "revolutionary" elements willing to engage in propaganda work. In selection, consideration is given to the degree of political consciousness of the candidate, his sense of duty as

22. For its Chinese text, see People's Daily, January 1, 1951.

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displayed in his present work, his personal association with the masses close to him, and his potential ability as a propaganda officer. To insure political reliability and professional competence, the appointment of a propaganda officer is subject to investigation and approval by the Party branch committee as well as approval by the higher Party organization concerned.

In Central-South China, propaganda officers are chosen from among the activists in factories, villages, or mass organizations after they have demonstrated their fitness for propaganda work during political or production campaigns. For example, during the Three-Anti Campaign, Party authorities in Chengchow, Honan discovered a great number of activists suitable for propaganda and agitation work who were subsequently recruited as propaganda officers.[23]

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23. Yangtze Daily, July 6, 1952.

There seem to be many advantages in choosing the occasion of some political of production campaign to select and recruit propaganda officers. First, such a campaign usually offers the best opportunity for the Party to find out who are the most politically reliable and professionally competent men. Second, by appointing the politically reliable and professionally competent activists who have emerged in a given campaign, the Party may make the persons concerned think that they have been given some public recognition of their efforts. Thus, the very process of recruiting propaganda officers may serve as a means for giving personal gratification and social prestige to those who have most enthusiastically helped the Communist regime in carrying out a given task.

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The Training and Duties of the Propaganda Officers Upon appointment, the propaganda officers are given training in the ideology of the Party, the use of propaganda material and techniques, and other related matters. Training is conducted through the so-called propaganda conferences, Party schools, and propaganda-officer training centers. The propaganda officer is also expected to study, on his own initiative, propagandist handbooks, news handbooks, newspapers, official documents, pamphlets, and other reference materials relating to his work as a propaganda officer.[24]

The propaganda officer's functions include the dissemination and elucidation, under the direction of the Party and by the simplest and most common of means, of current domestic and international developments; the publicizing of the policies of the Party and the People's Government and the duties of the masses, particularly those duties related to the time and locality in question. Furthermore, the propaganda officer is to refute "reactionary rumors" and "mistaken ideas" prevalent among the popular masses, encourage the masses to make a study of typical experiences gained in production and other work, and to exert positive efforts for the fulfillment of assigned tasks, as well as to render regular reports to the Party on the state of mind of the people in order to assist the Party in the choice of appropriate propaganda material.

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24. Wu Feng, Hsüan-ch'uan-yüan Kung-tso Chiang-hua [Lectures on the Work of the Propaganda Officer], Canton, Hua-nan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1952, p. 26.

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When the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concerning the establishment of a nation-wide propaganda network was announced at the beginning of 1951, there were in Central-South China only some 4,000 propaganda officers. By the end of 1952, incomplete statistics showed that the total number of propaganda officers in this region had been increased to 380,723, distributed as follows:[25]

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROPAGANDA OFFICERS

Name of Administrative Unit or Other Entity	Number of Propaganda Officers	Average Size of Audience per Propaganda Officer
Honan Province	111,652	395
Hupeh Province	109,913	231
Hunan Province	82,840	4,080
Kiangsi Province	41,720	402
Kwangtung Province	14,178	2,453
Kwangsi Province	11,082	1,765
Wuham Municipality	3,377	307
The Heng-yang Railway Administration	2,167	- *
Canton Municipality	1,931	661
The Chengchow Railway Administration	1,863	- *

* Not available

25. Yangtze Daily, August 16, 1952.

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Most of these propaganda officers operated with mutual-aid teams in factories, towns, villages, agricultural producers' co-operatives, and other mass organizations. They were unevenly distributed. As of December 1952, in a railway engineering plant in Hankow, there was one propaganda officer for every ten workers.[26] In July 1952, it was reported that the Party authorities in Honan Province set as their goal for the end of the year one propaganda officer for every 100 persons in the "progressive areas," and one propaganda officer for every 200 persons in the "general areas."[27]

The propaganda officers carry on their propaganda and agitation work both individually and collectively. While serving as propaganda officers, they retain their regular jobs. In a factory a propaganda officer is also invariably one of the workers. As mentioned above, the propaganda officer takes his propaganda and agitation work as a duty that he owes to his Party, and does not expect to be paid for his work.

The "Non-Party Propaganda Army" The strength of the propaganda officers cannot be gauged on the basis of their total number alone. It is to be noted that the propaganda officers, who are referred to by the Communists as the "propaganda army of the Party," often enlist the assistance of volunteer propagandists, called by the Communists the "non-Party propaganda army." The number of volunteer propagandists in a given unit is usually three or four times that of the propaganda officers. The Hsü

26. Ibid., December 25, 1952.
27. People's Daily, July 20, 1952.

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Feng-ch'i Model Propaganda Team in Yung-hsiu hsien of Kiangsi Province had 37 propaganda officers in December 1952, and 168 volunteer propagandists.[28]

The propaganda officers give guidance and direction to the volunteer propagandists in propaganda and agitation work. Hence, the volunteer propagandists are also called by the Communists "the reserve of the propaganda army of the Party."[29]

The Reporting Officer The reporting officer is "an advanced propaganda officer" whose duty it is to render to the people regular reports on current developments, Party policies, working aims, and work experiences. As such, he gives guidance to the propaganda officer, who is required to keep him regularly informed of the state of mind of the masses so that he may be better able to make his political reports in the light of such information. When such a report is made, the propaganda officers under him organize the people to hear it, and afterwards keep him informed of the mass reaction. If for any reason his report is not fully understood, the propaganda officer will clarify it by informal discussions at group meetings in order to dispel doubts or to clear up any misunderstanding.

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28. Tan Ning and T'ien Pai, "I-chih Ch'ien-chin-chung Ti Hsüan-ch'uan Tui-wu" ["A Unit of the Propaganda Army on March"], Yangtze Daily, December 9, 1952.

29. "Chien-chüeh Chih-hsing Tang-chung-yang Kuan-yü Chien-li Hsüan-ch'uan wang Ti Chüeh-ting ["Resolutely Put into Effect the Decision of the Central Authorities of the Party Concerning the Establishment of a Mass Propaganda Network"], editorial in Ibid., January 16, 1953.

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Reporting officers are found in all provincial, municipal, local hsien, and ch'ü (district) Party Committees. As of the end of May 1952, incomplete statistics show that Central-South China had 13,990 reporting officers.[30]

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTING OFFICERS

Name of Province or Other Entity	Number of Reporting Officers	Average Size of Audience per Propaganda Officer
Honan Province	4,'95	10,539
Hupeh Province	2,945	9,422
Hunan Province	2,532	14,127
Kiangsi Province	2,347	7,146
Kwangtung Province	781	44,519
Kwangsi Province	884	22,127
Wuhan Municipality	231	4,451
The Chengchow Railway Administration	105	*
The Heng-yang Railway Administration	105	*
Canton Municipality	48	26,592

* Statistics not available

30. Ibid.

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Most of these reporting officers were selected from among the secretaries and members of the Party committees on the provincial, municipal, local hsien, and ch'ü people's governments, and other Party members.

The reporting officer makes at least one political report every two months at mass meetings. Generally, additional reports are made at workers' meetings in urban areas. The topics on which the reporting officer speaks are either chosen or approved in advance by the secretary of the Party committee on a given level. After the delivery of a report, the reporting officer is required to submit an account to the Party secretary concerned. All of these devices are designed to enable the Party authorities to maintain close control over the activities of the reporting officer.

According to the Communists, the reporting and propaganda officers have been effective in educating the masses, in mobilizing public opinion, and in enlisting the support of the masses during various nation-wide campaigns such as the Resist-America-Aid Korea Movement, the Land Reform Movement, the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movement, the Three-Anti Campaign, the Five-Anti Campaign, the Campaign for Increasing Production and Practicing Economy, the Drought- and Flood-Prevention Campaign, and the recent campaign for "liberating" Formosa. Because they represent a direct line of communication with the Party and with local authorities, the reporting officers and the propaganda officers are said to be called by the masses the

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"information bureau," the "ministers of thought," and "the messengers of Chairman Mao."[31]

IV. PROPAGANDA STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUES

The strategy and techniques used by propagandists in Central-South China are similar to those used by propaganda organs elsewhere on the China Mainland.

The Saturation Technique One of the most striking features of the propaganda work of the Communists is its saturation technique, make possible by the existence of an all-pervading hierarchy of propaganda apparatus, the extensive use of all conceivable media of mass communication, and the concentrated employment of propaganda forces. Its effectiveness is enhanced by open suppression of competing propaganda and by care in the release of information on public affairs.

The Communist usually try to disseminate only one important idea at a given time. Whenever a major policy is to be disseminated, all propaganda organs, personnel, and media are set in motion to present this material forcefully and effectively. The Chinese Communists, often by means of threats either direct or implied and by persuasion, have succeeded in enlisting the support of numerous non-Communist people to help further their propaganda

31. People's Daily, January 1, 1952.

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work. In this way the dissemination of propaganda becomes more thorough, for the Chinese people may be inclined to believe that the ideas propagandized are not exclusively Communist in origin if so many non-Communists give them active support. The Communists permit the operation of some privately financed newspapers in Central-South China, although they remain under strict supervision and control. Many magazines eulogize the Communist regime and its "democratic" policies, since the privately-financed magazines must submit to supervision and control.

Planned Propanda and Agitation Before launching a propaganda campaign, the propaganda authorities invariably make careful preparations, including the establishment of the over-all plan for the campaign, directives issued to propaganda organs on lower levels, the selection of appropriate slogans, and the orientation of propaganda cadres to the ideological and political implications of the campaign. Once a campaign has been launched, the propaganda administrative organs check the development of the campaign, giving instructions to and supervising the performance of the propaganda cadres. After a campaign is over, all of its aspects are studied by the propaganda organs with a view to evaluating the experiences and criticizing any shortcomings and deviations.

Not only is the propaganda work carefully planned, but the "audience" to whom the propaganda is directed is organized into "newspaper reading groups," "broadcast listening groups," "mass meeting groups," "lecture listening groups," and so on. The

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propaganda officer on the "grass roots" level perhaps plays the most important role in organizing these receptive groups.

Reason and Emotion in Propaganda and Agitation Finally, it should be pointed out that the Communists have taken both human reason and emotion into careful account in their propaganda and agitation work. The reasoning they use is simple and concrete and often proves effective in convincing th untutored masses. To appeal to the emotions, the Communists attempt to arouse feelings of hatred, patriotism, and so forth. Vivid examples of "feudalistic exploitation," "imperialism," and so on, expressed in the most simple and direct language, are utilized to arouse the emotions of the audience.

V. AN EVALUATION OF PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

In the foregoing pages the propaganda machinery, the media of propaganda and public information, and some of the striking features of the Communist techniques and strategy have been surveyed. It is necessary to conclude with a brief evaluation of propaganda and public information in Central-South China as a whole. First, it is cle r that the Communist in this region have been building by making use of all available means an organization for mass communication. This organization, on the whole, is systematically and vigoriously administered. Propaganda and public information, as used by the Communists as instruments for remoldimg the ideology of the people, mobilizing public opinion,

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and enlisting popular support for their policies, are being dealt out to the people. But this does not mean that the Communists have completely succeeded in selling their ideology and policies to the people in Central-South China. The ever-increasing efforts on the part of the Communists to strengthen their propaganda and public information work is a sufficient indication that there still reminas a great deal more work to be done. 208

Furthermore, even if the Communist regime has succeeded in convincing the people, there is no guaranty that they will not be as susceptible to competing propaganda when it reaches them. At present, only the Communist Party has the right to disseminate propaganda. The people can learn only that which the regime wishes them to know. Consequently there is little opportunity for popular dissent. As long as competing propaganda is strictly prohibited from reaching the Chinese people, the popular response should not be considered voluntary or rational acceptance; the people have been denied the opportunity to exercise, unhampered their free will and faculties of reason. Furthermore, the saturation technique has already produced apathy, boredom, and callousness among some segments of the population.

No matter how effectively the Communist propaganda and public information machine is working, it can be seriously challenged by the free world if some way can be found to exploit all the Communist weaknesses and beam counter-propaganda to the people in Communist China.